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LEGAL ASPECTS O}" EUTHANASIA
VINCENT

C.

ALLItED, LL.B.

L egal Department, National Catholic Weltmoe Conte'renee, W ashill gton, D. C.

HIS paper will discuss eut ha nasia, or "mer cy killing," from a legal
viewpo int. The discussion is pa rticul a rly directed to that form of
eut hanasia contemplated in a proposed bill, introduction of which
was un successfull y attempted at the 1947 session or'the New York General Assembly. The p roposed bill would have permitted that "any person
of sou nd mind over twenty-one yea r s of age who is sufferi\lg from severe
physical pain caused by a disease, for which no remedy a ffording lasting
relief or recovery is at t hi s time known to medical science, may have
euth a ll a~ i a admillistered" at hi s own request a nd after a judicial hea rin g.
It, t herefo re, contempluted eut ha nasia of a voluntary type. Howeve r,
if a stat ut e permi ttin g vo lunta r y eutha nasia is eve r enacted, we call be
sure t hat ther e will be inllllediate agitation to broaden its provision~ so
as to a ut horize its compulsory application to certain cl asses, for in stance,
those suffering from painful and incurable illness, the mentall y defici ellt,
the aged, and others in ever broadening cat ego ries. The author will limit
hi s discussion to the legal aspects of the subj ect. It is taken for granted,
of co urse, that euthanasia in any form is a most heinous viol ation of the
Di vin e a nd natural law.

T

EUTHANASIA IN A NON-ExISTENT L EGAL STATUS

The actu al p resent status of eutha nasia may be summed up in a few
words. In the U nited States eutha nasia is prohibited ever ywhere and
under all conditions. Nowhere is it tolerated either by statute or judicial
decision. However , if a sta tute purporting to legalize eut ha nasia should
ever be enacted, then mercy killin g could be practiced under its sanction
without fear of legal penalties . (There will be no discussion as to the
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possibility that state legislation of this nature migli.t be held invalid under
the Constitution of the United States.) How would this legislation square
with previously existing concepts of la w? To answer these questions, we
must review briefly some fundamental principles of jurisprudence.
DIVINE AND NATURAL LAW

The law under which we live in the United States is derived from the
common law of England. The common law, in turn, was the product of
social evolution over centuries. It represents a social and political development the origin of which is lost in the antiquities of the Angles, the
Saxons, and other ancient inhabitants of Britain. It was developed in
the every day life of a rude community. Its principles were evolved by
hard headed men of action. In all respects the common law is, and always
has been, eminently practical and keyed to the everyday life of men.
Christianity softened many of its harsher features and made men more
conscious of the need for abstract justice in their dealings with one another. Two of England's chancellors have been canonized, St. Thomas
a'Becket and St. Thomas More. It is certain that in a legal system,
sometimes presided over by saints, there would be of necessity a striving
to follow the Divine and natural law, however far it might fall short of
that ideal in everyday experience.
The judges and lawyers who developed the common law were cognizant
of the precepts of Divine and natural law. Nor was this consciousness
lost when England left the Catholic Church. English lawyers, migrating
to America, took with them these high principles, and, from the beginning, they have been an element of our own law. It has been said that:
"Christianity has been declared to be the alpha and omega of our
moral law and the power which directs the operation of our judicial
system. It underlies the whole administration of the government, state
and national, enters into its laws, and is applicable to all because it embodies these essentials of religious faith which are broad enough to include all believers." Zollman, American Church Law, 1933, p . 26.
Sire William Blackstone has very concisely defined the relationship
existing between Divine and natural law, and the laws enacted by men :
"Law of Nature. This law, being coeval with mankind and dictated
by God Himself is obligatory on all. No human laws are of any validity
if contrary to this, as they derive their force and authority from this
original. We must discover what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life, by considering what method will tend the most effectively to our own substantial happiness."
"Revealed Divine Law. In compassion for the imperfections of human
reason, God has mercifully at times discovered and enforced his laws
by direct revelations. These are found in the holy scriptures. These
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precepts, when revealed, are really a part of the original law of nature.
The revealed law is of greater authenticity, than the moral system
framed by ethical writers, termed the natural law, because the one is
the law of nature, as declared to be by God Himself; the other is only
what, by the light of human reason, we imagine to be that law."

"Foundations of Human Law. Upon these two founda tions, the law
of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human law; i.e., no human
law should contradict them. Upon indifferent points, the divine and
natural law leave a man at his own liberty, subject for the benefit of
society to restrain within certain limits * * *."
"Example Instance of Murder . This crime is expressly forbidden by
the Divine law, and demonstrably by the natural law, and from these
prohibitions arise the true unlawfulness of the crime. Those hum an laws
that annex a punishment to it do not increase its moml guilt. If, therefore, any human law should allow or enjoin the commission of such crime,
we should disobey such law, or we would offend both the natural and
the divine."
"Unimportant Matters. In unimportant matters, not commanded 01'
forbidden by those superior laws, the inferior legislature has opportunity
to interpose and to make that action lawful which before was not so."
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Law, Gavit's Edition, p. 27.
How was mercy killing regarded under common law? One may search
in vain among the ancient writers for even a mention of mercy killing.
The killing of the helpless aged was practiced among Teutonic peoples
in early pagan times (Westermark, Ethical Relativity). This was definitely a savage custom and disappeared before the dawn of the historical
era.
Attention is called to Blackstone's remarks, above quoted, on the
subject of murder, and his opinion of any human law which might attempt
to legalize it. In another port ion of his Commentaries he speaks thus of
the sanctity of human life :

"Right of Personal Secu1·ity . Defined. This right consists in a person's
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
health and his reputation.
"Life. This right is inherent by nature in every individual and exists
even before the child is actually born.
"Natural Death. The natural life, the gift of the Creator cannot
be legally destroyed by an individual, neither by the person . himself, nor
by any class of individuals, merely on their own authority." Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Common Law, Gavit's Edition, p. 70.
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:MEltCY KI LLING I N THE LAW

There is nowhere in t he common la w a ll Y t oler'dion for mercy killin g.
Nowhere is it even mention ed by t he law wri ters of Blackstone's period
a nd before.
e mig ht, therefore, inquire into t he treatment afforded
under t he common law to subj ects a kin to mercy killing, such as assisting
and abetting a suicide, abor tion, and so forth.
nder t he Euthanasia
bill, recently p roposed to the New York L egislature, the consent of the
victim is required, so that he participates in hi oll'n death, and the
trHn saction bea rs consider able resembl a nce to sui cide. How was suicide
regarded under common la w, bo t h as to the party him self, a nd as to any
person who might ass ist him in hi s effor t? Let us retul'l1 to Blackstone:

'iV

"Self murder is one forlll of t hi s crime (felonious homicide) which
was the pretended heroism , bu t r eal co wa rdi ce, of t he Stoic p hilosophers ;
who thus avoided ill s, which t hey had not t he fortitude to endure. Though
apparently co untenanced by the Civil L a w it was denounced by the
Athenian law, which ordered the offenders ha nd to be severed from hi s
body . The English law ranks suicide amo ng t he hig he t crimes, a nd if it
has been done t hrough the advice of a not her, such accesso ry is gui lty of
murder."
"The la w in such cases can onl y r eac h the man 's rep utation a nd
fortune. H ence, it has ordered an ignominious buri al in the highway with
a stake driven through the offender's body and the forfeiture of hi s goods
and chattels to the king." upr a, 830.
W e cannot, of course, justify th forf eiture of goods which will affect
only t he surviving rel ative, who may be innocent, 1101' t he glulstly r even o '
wreaked on the co rp 'e, but at least this method of punishmeut docs
g raphicalJy illustrate the horror wi t h which self destruct ion was rega rded.
It will be noted t ha t the accesso ry to a successful suicide was deemed
guilt.y of murder .
How is suicide, and assistance t hereto, regarded ill t he United States?
To date, all jurisdictions follow the common law rul e. In most states the
crimin al la w has been codified . The statuto r y code follow COHlmon law
princip les, however, a nd t he cour ts t um to the common law for interp retation in doubtful cases. In som states t her e a re statu tes specifically
providing that a ny pe rson aiding in a suicid al attempt is g uilty of crimin al offense. Statutes of K a nsas a nd N ell' York a re set forth as typical
of this group:
"Every person deliberately assisting another in co mmission of self
murder shall be gui lty of ma nsla ughter in t he first degree." Section 21408, General Statute of Kan sas, 1939.
"Suicide is the intention al t aking of one's own life." Section 2300,
Article 202, Book 39, McKinney's Consolidated L a ws of New York.
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"Although suicide is deemed a grave public wrong, yet from the JlTIjJossibility of reaching the successful perpetrato r , no forfeiture is unposed." Section 2301, supra.
"A person who willfully, in any manner, advises, encou rages, abets or
assists a nother person in taking the latter's life is guilty of man slaughter
in the first degree." Section 2304, supra.
Even in stat es which have not enacted statutes on the subject, persons who a id in suicide attempts have heen held guilty of murder or mansla ught er by application of common law principles. The case of People
v Roberts, 178 N .'V. 690, (Michigan 1920) 13 American Law R eport s
1253, is a leading case on this point. It will be noted that this case also
involves the principl e of mercy slaying.
In that case the defendant's wife suffered from a n in curable illn ess,
and desiring to die she requested the defendant to place near her bed It
cup containing a mixture of Paris green. D efendant did as she r equested,
and his wife drank the mixture a nd died . He was convicted of murder in
the first degree and the sentence sustained by the Supreme Court of
Michigan. Quoting from the opinion:
" * * * counsel contends, in substance, that suicide is not a crime in
Michigan; t hat defendant's wife committed no offense in committing suicide; that if she, as principal committed .no offense, defendant committed
none as an accessory before the fact; in short, if the principal is not
guilty the accessory is not. '* * * But defenda nt'* '* '* is charged with
murder . '* * * The important question, therefore, arises as to whether
what defend a nt did constitutes murder by means of poison * '* '* ."
"In considering t he status of one who advises or aids another to commit suicide, Cyc has t his to say:
"Where one person advises, aids or abets another to commit suicide
and the other by reason thereof, kills himself, and the advisor is present
when he docs so, he is guilty of murder as a principal, or in some jurisdictions, of manslaughter, or if two persons mutually agree to kill themselves together, and t he means employed to produce death take effect
upon one only, the survivor is guilty of murder of the one who dies. But
if the one who encour ages another to commit suicide is not present when
the act is done, he is an accessory before the fact, and at common law,
escapes punishment because his principal cannot be first tried and convicted. The abolition of the distinction between aiders and accessories in
some jurisdictions has, howeve r; carried away this distinction, so that a
person may now be convicted of murder for advising a suicide, whether
absent or present at the time it is committed, providing the suicide is the
result of the advice." (37 Cyclopedia of Law and rrocedure 521)
"It is said in Tiffany on Criminal Law, p. 828, that 'he who kills
anqther at his own desire or command is a murderer as much as if he
had done it of his own head.'
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"We are of the opinion that, when defendant mixed the Paris green
with water and placed it within reach of his wife, to enable her to put
an end to her suffering by putting an end to her life, he was guilty of
murder by means of poiso n wit.hin the meaning of the statute, even though
she requested him to do so."
THE LEGAL GUILT OF THE ACCESSORY

It will be noted that the legal guilt of the accessory to a suicid~ was
definitely established at common law, but, on account of a procedural
point, the accessory was sometimes able to escape punishment. This
"blind spot" has been corrected in most jurisdictions as illustrated in the
Roberts case. It may be said that there is today no state in the union
in which the person who assists in a suicide attempt is free of criminal
guilt. The case of Grace v State, 69 S.W. 529 (Texas 1902) and
Saunders v State 112 S.W·. 68 (Texas 1908) are sometimes cited in an
attempt to hold that this rule does not hold in Texas. However, attention
is called to the following langu age in the Saunders decision:
"If appellant furnish ed ........................ with the carbolic acid at her request,
with full knowledge on his p art that she intended to take it, and did take
it, and destroyed her life, he, having no furth er agency in it, would not be
guilty. But if, knowing her purpose of destroying her life, at her request,
he prepared the medicine and himself placed it in her mouth, and she
swallowed it, then it would be an administration of this poison, and he
would be punished in case of death as a murderer."

It may be considered then that the decision in the Saunders case turns
on the point of causation only, and while the soundness of its reasoning
may be questioned from the viewpoint of logic and morals, it does not
make the T exas rule an exception to the basic principle upheld elsewhere.
(For other cases on this point of the guilt of the accomplice to a suicide,
see the annotation to the Roberts case, 13 A.L.R. 1253.)

While speaking of suicide, the "suicide pact" might be mentioned as
bearing on the topic of mercy slaying. The rule is stated as follows in
American Jurisprudence :
"With the possible exception of those jurisdictions where neither the
person who commits suicide nor the one furnishing the means of committing it, violates the law if two persons mutually agree to kill themselves
together, and the means· employed to produce death take effect on one
only, the survivor is guilty of the murder of the one who dies. The fact
that the deceased consented will not remove the case from the grade of
felonious homicide." 26 Am. J ur. 217.
The case of Turner v State, 108 S.W. 1139 (Tennessee 1908) 15
Law Reports Annotated, New Series 988, concerned a suicide pact. In
the opinion is found a very concise exposition on the law on this subject:
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Defendant was convicted of murder, having shot to death the deceased
woman, with whom he had carried on a love affair. Evidence indicated
that the two had planned a suicide pact, but after the death of the deceased, defendant could not go through with his part. The Supreme
Court of the State sustained the conviction. Quoting from the opinion:
"The fact that the woman consented and the crime was in execution
of a joint agreement would not remove the case from this grade of felonious homicide, since the crime embraced all the elements of malice, deliberation, and premeditation necessary to constitute murder in the first
degree. Murder is no less murder because the homicide is committed at
the desire of the victim. He who kills another upon his desire or command is, in the judgment of the law as much a murderer as if he had done
it merely of his own head * * *."
MERCY KILLING AND ABORTION

Another matter which is akin in principle to mercy killing is that of
abortion, together with the offense involved when the woman dies in consequence. As abortion, is usually performed with the consent of the
woman, the element of consent by the victim is involved. "In criminal
law the crime of abortion is the wilful bringing about of an abortion
without justification or excuse. At common law such act was a misdemeanor only." 1 American Jurisprudence 133.
All the American states have enacted statutes specifically providing
that any abortion not deemed necessary for the preservation of the
mother's life is an offense. In addition most states have specifically provided that, if the woman dies, the perpetrator is guilty of felonious
homicide in some degree. The statute of Illinois is typical:
"Whoever, by means of any instrument, medicine, drug or other
means whatever, causes any woman, pregnant with child, to abort or
miscarry, or attempts to procure or produce an abortion or miscarriage,
unless the same were done as necessary for the preservation of the
mother's life, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one
year, nor more than ten years; and if the death of the mother results
therefrom, the person procuring or causing the abortion or miscarriage
shall be guilty of murder." Section 3, Chapter 38, Smith Hurd Annotated
Statutes of Illinois.
The decision of State v Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 95 American Decisions
776 (1868) contains a very concise resume of the common law principles
underlying these points:
The Supreme Court of Iowa approved conviction of murder in second
degree of defendant who administered a drug to the deceased woman, with
her consent, to produce an abortion. She died in consequence. Quoting
from the opinion:
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"The right to life and to pe rsonal safety is not on ly sacred in the
cstimation of the common law, but is inalienable. It is no defense to the
defendant that the abortion was p r ocured with the consent of the deceased. * * *."
"We hold, therefore, that, in cases of homicide, malice may, as at
common law be implied from any act unlawful and dangerous in its nature, unjustifiably commit.ted."
"Nearly two hundred years ago, Lord Hale laid down the law as
follow s: 'If a woman be with child, and anyone give her a potion to
destroy the child within her, and she takes it, a nd it works so strongly
that it kill s her, this is Illurder: for it was not to cure her of a disease,
but unl a wfully to destroy the child within her a nd, therefore he that gives
a potion to this end mu st take the hazard and if it kills the mother, it is
murder.' (Hale, Pleas of the Crown , 429.)"
DUELLING

Another instance of legal guilt despite the consent of the deceased
is in regard to the duel. The common law principle is stated in American
Jurisp rudence as follows:

"If two men deliberately agree to fight a duel with deadly weapons,
and the duel is fought pursuant to agreement, and one of t hem is kill ed,
his slayer is guilty of murder." 26 American Juri sprudence 290.
There were times in the
more in the breach than in
always been in force. Some
tion specifically prohibiting

past when this p rinciple of law was honored
the observance. However, the principle has
of the American states have enacted legislathe duel.
M U TILATION

The same moral principle heretofore discussed in con nection wi t h
euthanasia has been applied to the common law offenses of mayhem and
mutilation. "Mayhem * * * is the violently depriving another of the use
of such of his members as may weaken him in figh t. H ence, the cutting
off or dis abling a man' s h and or finger, the striking out hi s eye or fOl' etooth, or depriving him of parts of hi s body which sustain his courage
are held to be mayhems." Bl ackston e's Commentaries, Gavit's Edition,
page 838. This common law co ncept of mayhem had its origin in the
king's solicitude that hi s subj ects be preserved from such physical injury
as would detract from t hei r effectiveness as soldiers. Thc infli ction of
other physical injuries was covered under the lesser common la w offenses
of assault, battery or wounding.
" It has been held that if one maimed himself or procured him self to
be 'maimed, both he and the party by whom the maiming was effected were
subject to fine a nd imprisonment. " 40 C. J. 2.
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It is probable that the royal prcrogativc had something to do with
this clement of non-consent in mutilation cases. Yet the principlc establishcd is in conformity with that prcvailing in other fields of the criminal
law. Therc is no rcason to suppose that it would havc been otherwisc,
evcn had therc been no consideration involved in connection with military
effcctiveness.
lVloTIVES ANU M~:R C Y KILLINGS

'iVe find fcw American cases turning on the point of mcrcy kiUing
spccifi cally. It is stated in American Jurisprudence:
"Only a very snlall numbel' of cases of homicide havc turned on thc
humanitarian motivcs of thc slayer. In all such cascs, however, whcrc
the strict legal rights of the people (the prosecution) have been presscd,
thc courts have held that the fact that the killing was done to relievc
suffcring, p r csent or prospective, 01' was done from some other humani~
bria n motive, neithcr excused the killing nor mitigated the ofi·cnse. Thc
fact that thc motivc of the slayer is unselfish, 01', according to moral
standards what may bc termcd 'good' is not ordinarily recognized as a
defcnsc." 26 American Jurisprudencc 228. (The propricty of this referencc by American Jurisprudence to such standards as "good" may, of
coursc, be questioned, but that does not affect the principle stated.)
One casc in which the defendant attempted to make "mercy killing" a
defense was that of People v Roberts, supra.
Another case of interest, although the defense of mercy killing was
not spccificall y invoked was that of People v Sherwood, 3 N.E. (2d) 581
(Ncw York 1936).
The defendant, a poverty stricken widow, drowned her two year old
because, being unable to find work, she feared she could not support
him. She was indictcd for first degrec murder. It appeared horn thc
official report that on her trial the matter of mercy killing was not interposed as a defense, but rather a question of sanity. She was convicted
v,s chargcd, but the conviction was set aside in the Court of Appeals on
account of procedural errors. 'iVhen again arraigned for trial she was
pcrmittcd to enter a p lea of guilty of manslaughter. She was sentenced
to prison, and paroled after serving two and a half years on a fifteen
ycar scntencc. (Sunday Mirror Magazine, August 18, 1940)

SOil,

There havc been a number of other cases chronicled in the daily
prcss, and on which, there being no appeal to an appellate court, therc
are no official reports available. The results in such cases have somctimes been influenccd by the personal feelings of judges and juries, so that
while in some instances the full penalty of the law was enacted, in others
the accused received mild punishment or complete exoneration. Under our
system of trial by jury, the jury har the power to acquit if it unanimously
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sees fit, no matter how clear the guilt of the accused may appear. For
instance, juries sometimes acquit the husband who had killed in cold
blood his spouse's lover, when court room appeal is made to the so called
"unwritten law."
It has been held in cases where death resulted from abortion that
"While consent to, desire for, or request of criminal abortion would not
constitute a defense, the jury is privileged to consider such facts in reaching their verdicts." State v Decker, 104 S.W. (2d) 307 (Missouri, 1937)

These situations where an accused may win acquittal, or conviction
in a lesser degree of the offense, through the sympathy of the jury do
not constitute any weakening of legal principles involved. The jury system, of itself, tends to indine our criminal procedure on the side of
clemency. It is in this regard, a safety valve, against instances where to
follow the strict letter of the law might work a real injustice in fact. For
!Jne thing it permits consideration of circumstances to indicate that ' the
accused may have been truly ignorant of the actual. malice of his deed,
or may have acted under the stress of some overwhelming emotion, not
amounting to legal insanity. It is almost inevitable that there will be
instances where jurymen blinded by well meaning, but misguided sympathies, will bring in verdicts contrary to legal principles or the precepts
of morality. That is part of the price we pay for the great boon of the
jury system, and the remedy is not its abolition, but rather education
of the public from which juries are drawn.
But regardless of what judges, juries or governors, with their pardoning power, may do in individual cases involving ~ercy killing, the
principle of law remains unchanged.
As long as common law principles in regard to the sanctity of human
life remain in effect, euthanasia, voluntary or otherwise, will be unlawful.
"The right to life and to personal safety is not only sacred in the
estimation of the common law, but it is unalienable." State v Moore, supra.
The observation of the court on the suicide pact in the case of Turner
v State, supra, is equally applicable to euthanasia. "The fact that the
woman consented and the crime was in execution of a joint agreement
would not remove the case from this grade of felonious homicide, since
the crime embraced all the elements of malice, deliberation and premeditation necessary to constitute murder in the first degree." Murder is
legally defined as "the killing of one human being by another with malice
aforethought." 26 American Jurisprudence 16l.
There may be some callous enough to say that persons in some of the
classes proposed for extinction by proponents of euthanasia can hardly
be called human beings, for instance idiots or frightfully deformed infants.
But .it is the law that "the killing of a lunatic, an idiot, or even a child
unborn is murder." State v Jones, 1 Mississippi 83 (1821)
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Likewise there may be some who will say that the element of "malice"
is absent in mercy killing, as the killer may have the most kindly feeling
toward his victim. Such persons betray their ignorance that the term
"malice" is used in this connection to express an extremely technical
meaning. It does not necessarily indicate that the killer had any personal
hatred or ill will toward the victim. This point is well covered in the case
of Turner v State, supra:
"It may be said, however, that there is an absence of express malice,
a necessary ingredient of the crime of murder, in the first degree, since
it is not shown there was hatred, or ill will, or malevolence on the part
of the prIsoner toward the deceased. * * * An actual and deliberate intention to take the life of another, or to do him some great bodily harm
from which death might probably result, constitutes express malice. * * *
It thus appears that it is not necessary that express malice, in the sense
of hatred or malevolence toward the deceased, should be shown in order
to support a verdict of murder in the first degree."

Fw,thermore, legal malice is the element which differentiates the more
serious offense of murder from that type of felonious homicide known as
manslaughter. Manslaughter is a serious offense, only slightly less culpable than murder. At common law man slaughter "is an unlawful killing
of a human being don e without malice, express or implied, either in a
sudden quarrel or unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful
act." 26 American Jurisprudence 165. Most states have enacted statutes
setting out the elements of murder and manslaughter, and often providing
for different grades or degrees in each offense. These statutes in general
follow common law principles, however, therefore, even if the element of
malice be omitted, mercy killing still contains all the elements of manslaughter. However, if it is difficult to see how euthanasia could fit in
any classification other than that of murder "with malice aforethought."
THE FUTUltE LEGAL STATUS OF EUTHANASIA

Such is the law as it exists in the 48 states today. But, after all,
existing law may be changed, and new laws enacted by constitutional
conventions and legislative assemblies. If the legisla'ture of any state sees
fit to enact a statute legalizing euthanasia, then euthanasia will be technically legal in that state. We know that there is some sentiment in this
country, and elsewhere, in favor of legalizing euthanasia. It is difficult
to say how numerous may be the proponents of this sentiment, but they
are quite vociferous. Bills to legalize the practice were introduced unsuccessfully in the British Parliament in 1936, and in the Legislature of
Nebraska in 1937. And as above stated there was an attempt made to
introduce such a measure at the 1947 session of the New York General
Assembly. It is probable that the proponents of euthanasia expected
these early failures . Most likely their thought is to try again and again

•
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in the hope that. each succeeding effort. will bring them nearer to success.
The agitation for euthanasia cannot be justified under the principles
of the common law, which looks to the Divine and natural law as supreme
on all vital concerns. But of late years there has arisen a school of
jurisprudence which refuses to acknowledge either Divine or natural law
as having any binding force. Legal pragmatism is defined as "a philosophy of law for the adjustment. of JJrinciples and doctrines to the human
condition as they arc to govern, rather than from assumed first principles
~, if. ¥.f Pragmatism worships at the altar of social reform. The pages of the
sociologist teem with the in equaliti es of our social, marital and industrial
relations '* '* *." Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law, by 'iVaIte~· H. Kennedy, 9 Marquette Law Review 63, February 1925.
PRAGMATI C JlTltISPltUDENCE

The pragmatic philosophy of law is sometimes referred to as sociological jurisprudence." In the work, "Jurisprudence" by Francis P. LeBuffe, S.J., Ph.D., and James V. Hayes, LLB, 1938, we find the following
comments on this system:
"Sociological jurisprudence proposes a social theo ry of the nature
of the legal order. It sees the present day stress on the social purposes
of law rather than on the analysis of legal rules and maxims as a progressive step in legal phi losophy.* * * It believes law to be a modern inst rulIlent for the satisfaction of human int erests. The task of lawmakers
is to r ecognize the human desires that are seeking r ealization in our
society and satisfy them with the least of friction and the least of waste.
~, * ~~ Sociological jurisprudence know s no way of valuing the respec tive
merits of the interests which are presently being r ealized by law. Likewise
it is without any norm for determining the r elative worth of conflicting
interes ts when olle group in society proposes the lega li zation of a particular interest, the prescription of which is demanded by a different
group. It ha s no method of getting at the intrinsic importance of any
human want, and it seems skeptical of the possibility of establi shing an
ultimat e norm against which to measure the merits of suggested legal
aims. '* '" * It advocates pu rsuing whatever purposes are recognized as the
'received ideals' of the time and place." Page 70.
It is not intended to go into any exhaustive discussion of the relative
merits of conflicting views on jurisprudence. But it is easy to see that,
in the philosophy of legal pragmatism, one may find the arguments by
which it is sought to justify euthanasia. If we should det ermine, as the
proponents of euthanasia claim, that those suffering from incurable
malady should be permitted the privilege of self-destruction, then, according to the pragmat.ist, the law should be amended to authorize such procedure. That such is prohibited by the natural law and the law of God
is immaterial to them. Natural law and Divine law, according to the
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pragmatist ure persuasive only, not uinding. A nd , of course, there are
not lacking those who deny the ex istence of any higher law. Law, they
say, is the command of the sovereign, the will of the people. It is a thing
in the last analysis of brute force. If you have enough bayo nets and atom
bombs you can make a nd en force any kind of law you wish.
It is not claimed that all advocates of legal pragmatism favor euthanasia. Probabl y the great majorit y of them abhor euthanasia as much
as we do. But they have debarred themselves from urging against it the
most effective a rgumen t. They may a rgue that it is socially undesirabl e,
that it violates concepts of human pity, and so forth. But, of the sovereign power in the state (the majority of the people in a democracy, or the
dictator in a totalitarian regime) decides in f avo r of euthanasia, they
can argue no further. There is no stronghold of moral power to which
they can retreat. They cannot say with Blackstone: "if, therefore, any
human law should allow or enjoin the commission of such crime, we should
disobey such law, 01' we would offend both the natural and the divine."
Even less could they say, as did St. Peter ",iVe must obey God, rather
than men." R egardl ess of how the followers of legal pragmatism may
personally feel on the subject of euthanasia, if thi s practice is ever legalized, it must be under the principle they advocate. That is, that the legislat.ure has the right to legalize a ny practice, no ma tter how it may
square with the Divine and nat.ural law, if only the same is deemed socially desirable at a given time and place.
STERILIZATION AND EUTHANASIA

At this point it might be in order to say a few words about. the sterilization legislation which has been enact ed in a number of American states.
Statutes of this nature, while differing in detail, provide in general t.hat
the operat.ion of sterilization may be performed on mental defectives who
might otherwise transmit this deficiency to their children. The constitutionality of such statutes has been sustained in the Supreme Court of the
United States in the ease of Buck v Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 71 L. Ed. 1000,
47 S. Ct. 584 (1927). In the opinion in t.hat case it is stated as follows:
"The judgment finds the facts that have been reci ted, and that Carrie
Buck 'is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring,
likewise afflicted, that she may be sexually sterilized without detriment
to her general health, and that her welfare and that of society will be
promoted by her sterilization.' In view of the general declarations of the
legislature and the specific findings of the court, obviously we cannot say
as a matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if they exist they
justify the result."
Catholic thought regards sterilization as morally wrong for the reason
that it is an unwarranted mutilation of the human body and sinful. It
does not deprive the subject of life, but it does deprive him of a physi('nl
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member on the one hand, and denies life to his otherwise possible offspring
on the other. It was observed by a legal annotator for American Law
Reports in an annotation to a sterilization case reported at 40 A.L.R.
535 as follows: "It may be said in limine that asexualization of the feeble
minded opens a dangerous door which leads to the position that the state
may in its discretion destroy all feeble minded per sons." This theoretical
speculation calls to mind the recent Nazi gas chambers.
There is, of course, a wide difference in fact between sterilization and
euthanasia, if only because the one destroys already existing life, while
the other does not. But, as pointed out, the former is a "dangerous door"
to the latter. Among other things it would appear that the legal justification for sterilization is another instance where the doctrines of pragmatism have been applied in jurisprudence. It is sustained, not by any reference to the moral or natural law, nor by appeal to legal deduction, but
solely on the basis of a newly originated social theory to the effect that
the state is justified in going to this length of human mutilation to prevent the possibility of "socially inadequate offspring." Those social and
legal mentalities which approve sterilization can very readily fall into
acceptance of euthanasia. This illustrates the basic fallacy inherent in
the pragmatic conception of law. "It has no method of getting at the
intrinsic importance of any human want * * * It advocates pursuing
whatever purposes are recognized a s the 'received ideals' of. the time and'
place." Jurisprudence, by L eBuffe and Hayes, ,supra. It has been used
to secure judicial approval for sterilization. It can be urged as a justification for euthanasia .
. EUTHANASIA IN

J UDI.CIAL

PHILOSOPHY

It would appear, therefore, that insofar as its legal aspects are concerned, the controversy over euthanasia does not concern judicial precedent as much as judicial philosophy . If we follow the common law view
that human law must be in harmony with Divine and natural law, insofar
as vital principle is concerned, euthanasia is unthinkable. If we follow
the philosophy of pragmatic jurisprudence then we can only argue as to
the social factors involved and cite legal precedents.
Mercy killing has been practiced in savage communities. "We find,
for instance, among many people the custom of killing or abandoning
parents worn out with age or disease. It prevails among a large number
of savage tribes and occurred formerly among many Asiatic and European nations, including the Vedic people and people of Teutonic extraction * * * This custom is particularly common among nomadic hunting
tribes, owing to the hardships of life and the inability of decrepit persons
to keep up in the march. In times when the food supply is insufficient to
support all the members of a community it also seems more reasonable
that the old and useless should have to perish than the young and
vigorous."
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"And among peoples who have r eached a certain degree of wealth and
comfort the practice of killing the old folks, though no longer justified
by necessity, may still go on, partly through survival of a custom inherited from harder times, and partly from the human intent of putting
an end to lingering misery. What appears to mo st of us as an atrocious
practice may really be an act of kindness, and is commonly approved of,
or even insisted upon, by the old people themsdves." W estermarck Ethical Relativity, page 184.
As civilization progresses mercy killing t ends to disappear. Instead
of killing their aged parents men began to pride themselves on ca ring for
the helpless old folks. And with Christianity there appeared the sublime
conception that suffering ennobles both the one who suffers, and him who
ministers to the sufferer. And these principles, even if not expressed in so
many words, were deeply written into the common law under which our
civilization reached its maturity.
The advocates of mercy killing say that we are all wrong about this.
All the great judges and lawyers of the common law, were wrong. The
experience of fifteen hundred years has been a blind alley in this respect.
The skin clad caveman was socially correct and morally justified when
he beat out his mother's brains because the old woman asked for an
extra portion at dinner.
Of course, they will say that the New York bill provides for only
voluntary euthanasia with all sorts of safeguards to prevent abuse. But
one thing leads to another, and once we have voluntary liquidation, there
will be an agitation to broaden the law to include all those whom the
mercy killers feel are not fit to live. There is no help for it; when we adopt
euthanasia in any form we are on the path back to the jungle.
THEOCENTRIC OR ANTHROCENTRIC MORAI.ITY

Therefore, in conclusion, let us repeat that while there is no legal
precedent for euthanasia, citation of legal precedents alone will not avail.
The issues are too deep and fundamental. It is part of the conflict between two systems of thought; between that system which recognizes its
obligation to God and His Law and the other system which claims·. that
man need have no higher motive than the gratification of his own desires.
And as reflected in the law, the conflict is between the common law school
of thought which pays reverent tribute to the Divine and natural law,
and those new legal philosophies which hold that law is no more than the
command of the sovereign, be that sovereign a legislative majority or the
dictator of a totalitarian state.

